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When late patriarch Deng Xiaoping first con-ceived the “one country, two systems” schemain the early 1980s for taking back the last jewel
of the British Empire, the emphasis was pretty much on the
“two systems,” that is, maintaining Hong Kong’s capitalist
economic structure and liberal political framework for at
least fifty years. In the early days of China’s reform and
open-door policy, Hong Kong not only invested heavily in
coastal cities but also taught a whole generation of cadres
how to negotiate the cunning corridors of the market econ-
omy. Partly to reassure skittish Hong Kong businessmen,
Deng reiterated that Beijing’s role in the future SAR would
be minimalist. Up until the mid-1980s, Deng and liberal col-
leagues such as Party chiefs Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang
told Hong Kong visitors that apart from changing the flag
and the national anthem, there would be little in the way of
changes post-1997((2). Regarding the zhigang banzi, or the
SAR’s ruling team, Deng noted that it should comprise ele-
ments “from the left, centre and right,” meaning that even
“rightists”—citizens with “pro-West,” or “bourgeois-liberal”
views who support national unity—should make up the future
SAR administration((3).
By 2007, however, the “one country” aspect of Deng’s slo-
gan has towered over the “two systems.” This is due to the
fact that the mainland market has become the most important
pillar of Hong Kong’s prosperity, the very lifeline of its econ-
omy. The PRC is now the second-largest economy in the
world (on price-parity terms), with foreign-exchange holdings
in excess of US$1.2 trillion. Other aspects of the da qihou
affecting Hong Kong and Beijing-SAR ties have undergone
significant mutations. This paper will look at factors behind
Beijing’s decision, particularly after 2003, to interfere directly
in internal Hong Kong affairs. Efforts will also be made to
explain why broad sectors of the SAR community seem un-
willing to put up a fight, in the sense of safeguarding Hong
Kong’s autonomy through means including supporting pro-
democracy forces that are clamouring for an early realisation
of full-fledged democracy. After all, the Basic Law, Hong
Kong’s mini-constitution, makes it clear that the election of
the chief executive (CE) by universal suffrage is the “even-
tual goal” of political development. This paper will conclude
by making some predictions over the evolution of SAR poli-
tics and Beijing-SAR relations in the foreseeable future. Bei j ing’s  poli cy  toward theSAR’s  poli t ica l  deve lopment  
Incumbent CE Donald Tsang’s triumphant “re-election” in
March this year to a second term should, in theory, have re-
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1. Deng Xiaoping’s theory about da qihou (the “macro climate”) was laid out while meet-
ing PLA representatives five days after the June 4th massacre 1989, see New China
News Agency, 9 June 1989.
2. In the early 1980s, Deng told Hong Kong visitors that there was no need to station troops
in post-1979 Hong Kong. In mid-1984, he reneged on his earlier promise by pointing out
that the PLA would be stationed in Hong Kong as a symbol of Chinese sovereignty. See
Ming Pao (an independent Hong Kong daily), 26 May 1984.
3. Cited in Wu Kangmin (a Hong Kong deputy to the Chinese National People’s Congress),
“Who will be the Chief Executive in 2012?” Ming Pao, 14 April 2004.
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Five days after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Deng Xiaoping indicated that this “counter-revolutionary turmoil”
was bound to happen because of trends in the da qihou (literally, the larger climate; figuratively, major domestic and
global developments((1)). To understand the intriguing changes that have taken place in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR) ten years after 1 July 1997, it is instructive to assess changes in not only Hong Kong
itself but also Beijing-Hong Kong relations. China’s precipitous rise to within striking distance of attaining “quasi-
superpower” status also has to be taken into account. 
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assured the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership
that granting full suffrage to the SAR’s seven million people
would not impact adversely on the long-standing goal of
“maintaining Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.” Tsang,
a career civil servant who was knighted by the British just
before 1997, has convinced Beijing of his unstinting loyalty.
In opinion polls conducted in the run-up to the polls, Tsang
consistently garnered more than 70% of popular support.
During the “small circulation election” on 25 March Tsang
secured the backing of 649 out of the 789 members of the
Electoral College. On the other hand, Tsang’s opponent,
pro-democracy barrister and legislator Alan Leong, captured
barely 123 ballots—coupled with around 20% of popular sup-
port in opinion surveys((4). 
Moreover, the SAR’s pro-democracy political parties are di-
vided—and seem to be losing popular support at least in the
foreseeable future (see following section). At the same time,
the main pro-Beijing party, the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), seems to be going from
strength to strength. As things stand, DAB legislators as well
as deputies from the pro-business, pro-government Liberal
Party, enjoy a sizeable majority in the Legislative Council
(LegCo), Hong Kong’s parliament. This “unholy alliance”
between “leftist” and business-oriented legislators will en-
able most initiatives and bills drafted by the Tsang adminis-
tration to sail through LegCo. After all, the pro-democratic
forces could muster no more than twenty-four or so of
LegCo seats((5).
In theory then, there is hope that the CCP administration,
having seen the momentum going the way of the pro-estab-
lishment forces, may afford to quicken the pace of democ-
ratisation. After all, a good chunk of the populace is ready
to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt. Even Leong has
noted that the leadership’s policy toward the SAR is “prag-
matic and rational.” A post-CE election poll noted that an
overwhelming 78% of SAR residents expressed confi-
dence in the viability of “one country, two systems((6).” And
upon getting his protocol of appointment from central lead-
ers in early April, Tsang put a positive spin on President
Hu’s statement about the SAR’s political developments.
Tsang quoted Hu as having told him that Beijing fully
backed the goals of “developing the economy, improving
livelihood and advancing democracy in a gradual and or-
derly manner; maintaining Hong Kong’s prosperity, stabil-
ity and harmony are the common wishes of Hong Kong cit-
izens((7).”Hu’s words were taken as rendering support for at
least an incremental but sure progress of democracy in
Hong Kong. 
Hu to  maintain  tough l ine  on  Hong Kong
In fact, Tsang’s good showing may only have convinced the
CCP leadership under Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao that its
tough tactics toward “taming” Hong Kong have succeeded—
and that there is no reason to change this policy. Moreover,
in their second five-year term (2007-2012), the Hu-Wen
team will continue to be preoccupied with a host of domes-
tic and international challenges ranging from peasant riots
and corruption scandals to ways to counter Washington’s
perceived “anti-China containment policy.” Compared with
Third-Generation leaders such as ex-president Jiang
Zemin—who regarded the peaceful SAR “handover” to be
one of his legacies—Hu and Wen do not accord top priority
to Hong Kong affairs, especially when things are going Bei-
jing’s way. Hu’s views on political matters within the SAR
have not changed much since he took over the supremo’s
post in late 2002. While meeting former CE Tung Chee-
hwa in August 2003, Hu pointed out that the SAR’s polit-
ical system “must develop in an incremental and gradualist
manner((8).”
Much of the Hu-Wen team’s thinking about Hong Kong
could be traced to the CCP leadership’s reaction to perhaps
the most significant show of people power in Hong Kong
ever. On 1 July 2003, an estimated 600,000 people hit the
streets to demonstrate against the misrule of Tung, a politi-
cally maladroit shipping tycoon handpicked by former presi-
dent Jiang to run the SAR. The protestors also vented their
fury at the impending enactment of the anti-sedition Article
23 of the Basic Law—and demanded a quickening of the
pace of democratisation. Beijing’s response to this act of de-
fiance was, as Hu told Tung a few weeks later, to ask the
SAR administration to raise its guard against “foreign forces
and external forces” interfering in SAR affairs((9). The term
“foreign forces” is a standard shorthand for “anti-PRC ele-
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4. “Tsang secures victory with 649 ballots,” Ming Pao, 26 March 2008. The election of the
CE is considered a “small-circle election” because the majority of the 800 members of
the Election College are deemed pro-Beijing, pro-establishment figures who are ex-
pected to heed Beijing’s instructions about who to vote for.
5. The current LegCo consists of 30 directly elected deputies and 30 deputies coming from
so-called functional constituencies. The latter include professional bodies and chambers
of commerce—and are dominated by pro-Beijing elements.
6. “Hong Kong University survey on Hong Kong people’s confidence in the mainland,” Wen
Wei Po (a Chinese-run Hong Kong daily), 27 April 2007.
7. Klaudia Lee, “Hu recognizes HK’s desire for democracy,” South China Morning Post (a
Hong Kong English-language paper), SCMP, 10 April 2007.
8. Cited in Wily Lam, “‘One country, two systems’ after July 1,” China Brief, a publication
of Jamestown Foundation, a Washington think tank, 29 July 2003.
9. Ibid.
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ments in the United States,” while the term “external
forces” refers generally to Taiwan. International affairs ana-
lysts believe the CCP leadership is convinced that pro-dem-
ocratic forces in Hong Kong are colluding with “anti-China
foreign forces” such as United States-based organisations
and the Catholic Church to undermine Beijing’s authority.
According to political sources in Beijing, the Hu leadership
has even made comparisons about the inchoate democracy
movement in the SAR to the series of “colour revolutions”
that have shaken Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan since the
early 2000s((10). 
The Hu-Wen leadership’s reaction to the 1 July 2003 event
was comparable to that of Deng toward the mass rally that
was held by some one million Hong Kong citizens in late
May 1989 to show solidarity with the Tiananmen Square
demonstrators. After putting down the “rebellion,” Deng
took immediate steps—such as inserting Article 23 into the
Basic Law—to prevent the SAR from becoming a base for
subversion against the motherland((11). After mid-2003, Bei-
jing adopted noticeably tougher measures to thwart the ad-
vance of the pro-democracy forces. Interference in SAR af-
fairs is mainly perpetrated through the SAR’s “leftist” estab-
lishment. The latter includes the following elements: Bei-
jing’s official mission in Hong Kong, called the Liaison Of-
fice of the Central Government (LOCG); a corps of state
security agents thought to number around a few thousand;
pro-Beijing political parties such as the DAB, which is
thought to contain a fair number of CCP members; SAR-
based members of Chinese political organisations such as
the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s parlia-
ment; and Beijing-affiliated media including two newspapers
directly run by the CCP((12).
Beij ing’s  al l -too-vis ible  hand in action
Beijing’s intrusion in SAR politics is perhaps best illus-
trated by the heavy-handed manner with which the leftist
establishment has tried to influence the debate on democ-
ratisation as well as the outcome of particular elections.
NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo, who is number two in the
CCP Politburo Standing Committee, made it clear earlier
this year that the SAR had no business making demands on
Beijing to quicken the pace of democracy in Hong Kong.
“The political system [of the SAR] falls under the central
authorities’ jurisdiction, not that of the SAR,” Wu said.
“The Basic Law has ensured an executive-led government,
and that the SAR government should report to central au-
thorities((13).”
On the eve of the March CE polls, Wu also noted that Bei-
jing favoured a “chief executive who loves the motherland
and Hong Kong, and who has the ability to materialise the
‘one country, two systems’ model((14).” Despite the com-
monly acknowledged fact that Alan Leong had virtually no
chance of upsetting Tsang’s CE candidature, senior Chi-
nese leaders ranging from Premier Wen and to State Coun-
cillor in charge of Hong Kong affairs Tang Jiaxuan had
gone out of their way to profess support for the Tsang can-
didacy. No Beijing leaders deign to even give Leong a men-
tion. It was left to pro-Beijing politicians and media in the
SAR to pillory Leong. The two “left-wing” papers, for ex-
ample, repeatedly blasted Leong for “attacking the central
authorities,” adding that his agenda for political reform
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10. Author’s interviews with sources in Beijing, January 2004. For a discussion of Beijing’s
views about the series of “colour revolutions” in central Asia, see, for example, Vladimir
Radyuhin, “Shifting balance in Central Asia,” The Hindu (New Delhi), 20 July 2005.
11. Article 23 and other clauses aimed at preventing Hong Kong from “subverting” the
mainland were added after the June 4th massacre 1989.
12. For a discussion of the left-wing establishment in Hong Kong, see, for example, Willy
Lam, “Life in the Shadow”, The World Today, monthly publication of Chatham House,
London, March 2007. Pro-democracy legislators in Hong Kong have warned against the
presence to large numbers of state security personnel in the SAR, see, for example,
Emily Tang, “Mainland spies have free rein: legislator,” The Standard (a Hong Kong Eng-
lish-language daily), 28 June 2004.
13. Cited in “The authority of the central authorities cannot be challenged,” Wen Wei Po, 8
March 2007.
14. Ibid.
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Young activists promoting democracy 
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amounted to an attempt to tear up the Basic Law and to un-
dermine Beijing’s authority((15).
In the run-up to the September 2004 LegCo polls, pro-Bei-
jing elements in Hong Kong pulled out the stops to mobilise
support for candidates fielded by “patriotic” parties such as
the DAB, some of whose leaders are thought to be CCP
members. For example, the hundred of thousands of resi-
dents working for China-owned firms in the SAR received
circulars and other admonishments to vote for DAB politi-
cians. A fortnight before the elections, the two China-run
newspapers ran sensationalist accounts and pictures of Dem-
ocratic Party LegCo candidate Alex Ho being arrested by
mainland police for allegedly patronising a prostitute in
Dongguan, a city close to Hong Kong((16).
Beijing has also proffered carrots aplenty as it is wielding a
big stick against Hongkongers who dare defy its authority. In
2003, Beijing and the SAR signed the Closer Economic
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), which makes possible,
the among other things, tariff-free entry of Hong Kong-man-
ufactured products into the mainland. CEPA has also
smoothed the way for professionals in fields such as law and
accountancy to practice in the mainland. Beijing has also lib-
eralised procedures for Chinese who want to come to Hong
Kong as tourists. Last year, some 13.59 million Chinese
tourists, including big-spending, nouveau riche denizens of
the eastern coast, visited the SAR. Also in 2006, a record
number of large state-owned enterprises, including the major
banks, chose the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) to
launch their initial public offerings (IPO). All these have
the effect of consolidating Hong Kong’s reputation as the fi-
nancial centre of Asia. In 2006, IPOs on the local bourse
reached $40 billion, nearly $7 billion more than that of the
New York Stock Exchange. Half of the $1.8 trillion marketi-
sation of the HKSE is accounted for by PRC enter-
prises((17).Economic realit ies  vs.  demo-c ratic  forces  in  Hong Kong
The economic realities of Hong Kong seem to militate
against the political fortunes of its pro-democracy forces.
This is despite the fact that in the most recent territory-wide
elections—the 2004 LegCo polls—candidates of the pan-
democratic alliance garnered about 60% of the vote. Apart
from Beijing’s “boycott,” democratic parties have been con-
sistently snubbed by the business community. This becomes
obvious just by looking at the financial statements filed by
the Tsang and Leong campaigns. Tsang, the shoo-in candi-
date, received HK$22 million in donations from the who’s
who among Hong Kong’s tycoons: Li Ka-shing, Li Shau-kee
and so on. And Leong’s modest HK$3.8 million mostly
came from gifts from members of his own pro-democracy
Civic Party((18).
While their personal political philosophies may vary, the
great majority of businessmen in Hong Kong understand
the reality very well: the future of their businesses lies in
the China market, and they cannot afford to fall foul of
CCP leaders. (These same tycoons took the side of Bei-
jing when the CCP leadership huffed and puffed over the
democratic reforms introduced by Chris Patten, the last
British governor of Hong Kong, in the mid-1990s.) Bei-
jing, for its part, is a past-master in so-called united-front
tactics: in the case of Hong Kong, wooing the business
community and other socio-economic sectors while isolat-
ing the enemies, viz., the pro-democracy elements. Big in-
vestors in China—and supporters of Beijing’s Hong Kong
policy—are rewarded with not only commercial opportuni-
ties but also coveted slots on the National People’s Con-
gress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference((19). And these tycoons certainly would not risk
falling foul of the beidaren—so-called “grand mandarins
from up north”—by being seen as keen supporters of
democracy. That the democratic parties are cold-shoul-
dered by the business community is partly responsible for
the fact that their leaders lack the requisite expertise to ar-
ticulate a convincing platform on economic development.
Hence the overall perception that democratic parties are
virtually one-issue parties: they cannot offer voters much
beyond the vision of one-person, one-vote. 
Moreover, a sizeable proportion of the populace may also
think that casting a vote for pro-democracy politicians would
be a waste of resources given the fact that the latter are
“black-listed” by Beijing. Here, the psychology of “you do
not bite the hand that feeds you” may be at work. After all,
since the economy took off in the 1970s, more than two gen-
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15. See, for example, an article by a “special commentator” of the Wen Wei Po blasting Alan
Leong for “publicly challenging the central authorities’ constitutional powers,” in “Those
who go against people’s wishes will lose public support,” Wen Wei Po, 28 March 2007.
16. William Foreman, “Hong Kong surpasses New York in IPOs,” Associated Press, 24 De-
cember 2006.
17. Albert Wong, “Tycoons shunned Leong, poll expenses tally shows,” SCMP, 25 April 2007.
18. For a discussion of the Alex Ho affair, see, for example, John Chan, “Chinese police gen-
erate ‘sex scandal’ against Hong Kong election candidate,” World Socialist Website, 30
August 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/aug2004/hk-a30.shtml, accessed on
10 April 2004
19. Businessmen and “patriotic” professionals figure prominently among Hong Kong-based
delegates to the NPC and the CPPCC.
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erations of Hong Kong residents have realised substantial
socio-economic upward mobility. And if before 1997 a good
chunk of the population was willing to “tolerate” British rule,
the same number of residents are willing to settle for a sim-
ilar quid pro quo, that is, to accept limitations to their dem-
ocratic rights in exchange for Beijing-guaranteed “prosperity
and stability.” According to an early April poll undertaken
by the University of Hong Kong, 58% of SAR residents
said they had “trust” in the central authorities, up 11% from
about two years ago. And part of this trust has been an-
chored upon the perceived economic dispensation that Bei-
jing has granted the region. CEPA, for example, is credited
by the SAR administration for having generated 29,000
jobs for Hong Kong in the first two years of its implementa-
tion((20).
Members of pro-China parties such as the DAB have prof-
ited from these “feel good” sentiments to garner popular
support through pledges that they can serve their constituen-
cies in concrete ways thanks to their special relationship with
Beijing. During the 2004 LegCo elections, DAB candidates
picked up 455,000 votes, versus 392,000 in the previous
poll in 2000((21). DAB politicians have won Brownie points
by helping SAR residents who have encountered problems—
ranging from traffic accidents to legal disputes—north of the
Shenzhen River. The number of Hong Kong citizens work-
ing on the mainland had increased from 133,500 in 1998 to
228,900 in 2005. And close to half a million Hongkongers
are living, retiring or spending substantial periods of the year
on the mainland. Given that pro-democratic politicians can-
not function north of the SAR-Guangdong border, it is not
surprising that the DAB is growing in influence. By 2007,
the DAB had recruited 10,000 members, consolidating its
position as the SAR’s largest political party by member-
ship((22).
The most effective card that Beijing wields against pro-
democracy politicians then, is simply to ignore them. A
dozen-odd politicians in the Democratic Party and Civic
Party have been denied permission to go to the mainland,
even as tourists. CE candidate Leong’s requests for meet-
ings with Beijing officials have been denied. In light of the
fact that the Hong Kong economy, as well as the living stan-
dards of its residents, are dependent on Beijing, it is not easy
for pro-democracy politicians to garner the votes of those
who put economic benefits before political principles. As
Zeng Xianzi, a businessman and senior NPC member
noted with regard to the Leong candidacy, “I can’t see how
he can resolve the issue of the absence of recognition and
support from Beijing((23).”
Prospects  for  democrati sationin the  foreseeable future
In terms of the da qihou, Hong Kong’s dependency on Bei-
jing—as well as Guangdong and neighbouring provinces—is
set to grow in the coming decade. Quite a number of capi-
tal projects on which the SAR’s prosperity hinges, such as
the bridge linking Hong Kong with Zhuhai, requires the ap-
proval of the central authorities. Local financial institutions
are grateful for special policies such as the designation of the
SAR as a centre for the flotation of yuan-denominated
bonds. Particularly after the Chinese currency has become
fully convertible—which could happen within five years—
Shanghai, Tianjin and other star cities along the eastern
coast are in a position to compete with the SAR in the fi-
nancial and other services-oriented sectors. As Paul Yip, the
pro-China head of a Hong Kong think tank said, “Twenty
years ago, Beijing had to rely on Li Ka-shing; today, it’s Li
Ka-shing who has to rely on Beijing((24).”
A key campaign pledge made by Tsang is that the SAR gov-
ernment would table a proposal on democratisation—includ-
ing the issue of universal-suffrage polls to pick the future
CE—before the end of the year. While Tsang has asked the
democrats and other parties in Hong Kong to submit ideas,
the government has the final right to “mix and merge” all
proposals into a “mainstream” blueprint which would be put
to the public. And if this blueprint wins the support of 60%
or more of the populace, Tsang will put it to Beijing for final
approval. Given that the CE is beholden to the support of
power blocs such as the tycoons, the Liberal Party as well
as the DAB—and not to the pan-democratic alliance—demo-
cratic legislators have expressed grave doubts about whether
the government-sponsored blueprint would contain recom-
mendations for one-person, one-vote polls((25).
Almost inevitably, the fate of Hong Kong is predicated upon
the development of Chinese politics. President Hu, who has
turned out to be much more orthodox in ideological and po-
litical matters than expected, is due to step down in 2012.
However, the 64-year-old “neo-conservative” will likely ap-
38 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
20. Gary Cheung and Klaudia Lee, “Facing North,” SCMP, 23 April 2007.
21. “The DAB vows to scrutinize the government,” Commercial Daily (a Hong Kong daily),
14 September 2004.
22. Gary Cheung and Klaudia Lee, “Facing North,” ibid..
23. Cited in Willy Lam, The World Today, ibid..
24. “Today, Li Ka-shing has to rely on the Beijing central authorities,” Hong Kong Economic
Journal, 28 April 2007.
25. Albert Wong and Denise Hung, “Pan democrats fear mix and match on suffrage,” SCMP,
13 April 2007.
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point a successor among his so-called Communist Youth
League Faction, most of whose affiliates are not known for
their liberal proclivities. The “dual track policy” that Beijing
has followed after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in
1989—economic liberalisation coupled with intolerance to-
wards dissent and “Western-style” political values—is un-
likely to change in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there are
signs that Hu and his colleagues are trying to extend the
CCP’s somewhat tattered mandate of heaven by appealing
to their countrymen’s growing sense of nationalism. And this
could mean Beijing tightening control over Hong Kong, the
“autonomous regions” of Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as the
“breakaway province” of Taiwan. 
Yet still another factor working against the aspirations of
pro-democracy politicians and residents of the SAR is that
Beijing no longer needs to worry about international criti-
cism of its Hong Kong policies. If only to prove that
Britain has not “sold out” Hong Kong people through its
arduous negotiations with Beijing over the 1997 issue,
London has by and large claimed that post-1997 Hong
Kong has been a success story. And particularly after the
9/11 incident, Washington has played down its critique of
Beijing’s violations of human rights as well as Chinese
measures relating to Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang. In
any event, the Hu-Wen leadership is confident that with
the precipitous rise in China’s global status, more and
more Western countries—even those which used to set a lot
of store by humanitarian values—would refrain from “find-
ing fault” with Beijing’s policies toward an obviously pros-
perous SAR.
This somewhat pessimistic reading is a far cry from pre-1997
predictions that the free-wheeling, all-taboos-be-damned
mentality that underpins Hong Kong’s success could some-
how change—in the sense of “Westernising”—the mind-set of
the relatively well-educated and wealthy Chinese who live
along the eastern coast. It is true that Hong Kong movies
and Canto-pop music have made a big dent in the mainland
culture. And savvy businessmen like multi-billionaire Li Ka-
shing have continued to play a sizeable role in the integra-
tion of the Chinese economy to the global marketplace. In
terms of cross-pollination in the political arena, however,
Hong Kong is very much a David up against a Goliath with
Chinese characteristics. In many ways, the metamorphosis
of Hong Kong from British crown colony to SAR has
brought about a sinicisation of the political norms of its
seven million residents. The cold wind from up north has
blighted the hopes of the minority of democracy enthusiasts
that the SAR could show the way forward for 1.3 billion
Chinese who are still under the yoke of authoritarian one-
party rule. •
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